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Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) makes connections anywhere, with anything and anytime possible [1, 2] . It allows the development of a new generation of services and applications. The security and privacy aspects from both end-users and devices are essential for the credibility of future IoT systems. This is not an evident task, as the measures should be implemented in a highly efficient way due to the power and processing constraints which characterises many IoT devices. As such, existing standard protocols for security protection cannot be directly applied in the very constrained devices.
In order to establish a security key between two devices that are not necessarily known to each other, there are three options. (1) One could pre-share every time a common secret key in each of the devices. However, this method is quite impractical and represents an unscalable approach. (2) The second option is to use asymmetric security techniques. It results in adding high computational costs for resource constrained devices. (3) As last option, one could rely on a secure third party, also called the server or the proxy. In this last option, it is possible to establish the communication by means of low cost cryptographic operations, in the assumption that each of the devices share a common secret key with the proxy.
In this paper, we propose such a proxy-based key agreement protocol, using solely symmetric key based operations. Consequently, our proposed protocol is specifically designed for highly resource-constrained devices. The proxy is considered honest, but curious. This means that it will perform all the required actions, but might be interested in collecting the data for its own purposes (e.g. to offer it later for sale). Therefore, the task of the proxy is mainly to ensure the communication between two authenticated entities in the system and to establish a key agreement such that the transmitted ciphertext can be decrypted by the intended receiver. This results in a securely shared session key between the two entities. Moreover, no information about the sender and receiver can be derived by an outsider from the transmitted messages. Since some of the IoT devices can be linked to a person and other IoT devices linked to a particular application, some user behaviour can be derived from eavesdropping the communication channel. As people get more and more aware of the importance of anonymity, it is essential to add this feature to the current systems [3] .
Our protocol can be seen as a proxy re-encryption protocol, which is made anonymous using techniques from the area of multi-server authentication protocols. In a proxy re-encryption scheme, a ciphertext is converted in another ciphertext by the proxy, ensuring the involvement of the claimed entities. A technique to establish anonymity from the domain of multi-server authentication protocols is based on the asymmetric share of secrets between the entities and the servers, also called proxies here. Furthermore, we formally verify our proposed protocol by proving that the goals of the protocol are established (e.g. authentication, freshness, session-key establishment) and demonstrating the absence of design weaknesses that may be exploitable by mountable at-tacks [4] , [5] , [6] . We now discuss two usecases, one in the healthcare domain and the other for the industrial internet .
Usecases
A patient that wants to make use of the different services offered by a hospital can be an example of a use-case. During registration, the patient receives its individual required security material on its smart phone. When the patient requests a service (e.g. measurements of a physical parameter), it sends its pseudo identity information to that service, which is used by the service to communicate the resulting output via the proxy. Also health related info stored at the smartphone of the patient can be securely send to another authenticated IoT device in the hospital environment via the proxy. As a consequence, both patient's smartphone and any IoT device authenticated by the hospital can communicate with each other, without being mutually authenticated beforehand. Another example, is when a patient of a hospital requires a special follow up, based on a heart beat monitor attached to the patient. Every time, the heart beat monitor reaches a certain threshold, the most nearby light should be activated and a nurse call containing the history of the latest measurements should be send out. Again, through the usage of our proposed ALPKA protocol, there is no pre-shared key agreement required between the heart beat monitor and the smart light, or nurse call system. Figure 1 illustrates the communication flow in this usecase A mobile robot in a factory is another example of a usecase. In todays factory environment, the communication is happening between entities via common networks through WiFi networks. However, security provided by WiFi network are not sufficient to satisfy the security requirements in industrial standards such as ISO/IEC 27000. Therefore, an extra level of security is required to ensure the proper operation in a factory. By using the ALPKA protocol, the robot can retrieve the individual required security material during the registration. While moving across the factory, the robot requests a service form another device or robot. So, it can send its pseudo identity information to that service, which is used by the service to communicate the resulting output via the proxy. Also, control or monitoring info stored at the robot can be securely send to another authenticated IoT device in the factory via the proxy. Consequently, the robot can communicate to any authenticated IoT device in the factory, without being mutually authenticated beforehand. This is ideal for a factory environment since a robot has to communicate with a large number of IoT devices and it will reduce the additional authentication delay. It will drastically improve the efficiency of the production. Figure 2 illustrates how a single robot can securely communicate with multiple sensors by using the ALPKA protocol. Some proposals can be replicated, when multiple robots wants to communicate with multiple sensors. 
Paper outline
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related work. In Section 3, details are provided on the preliminaries that are used in explaining the protocol. Section 4 describes the proposed solution. Section 5 provides a brief analysis of the protocol. Section 6 presents the formal versification of the proposed protocol. In Section 7, the computational overhead of the protocol is discussed. Finally, Section 8 summarizes the paper by giving the conclusions.
Background and Related Work
Several standards have been proposed to establish End-to-End (E2E) security and key establishment in IoT, like Datagram Transport Layer Security [7] , Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) scheme [8] , and HIP-DEX [9] protocols. An interesting approach to further improve these standards has been suggested in [10] , [11] and [12] . In these papers, a proxy-based solution is proposed for delegating the heavy cryptographic operations from a constrained device to less constrained nodes in its neighbourhood. In both [10] and [11] , only one set of intermediary proxies are used in the key establishment protocols. This approach is generalized in [13] , where two different sets of proxies are used. The main disadvantage of these standards and their derivatives is that they still either rely on asymmetric key based operations based on the assumption of individual pre-shared secret key material, or proxies that are able to decrypt the transmitted messages and thus, able to derive the common shared session key.
Besides the standards, there have been many other server assisted key establishment protocols proposed in literature. Most of them use public key based operations, such as modular exponentiations [14] , [15] and even pairing operations [16] , [17] . We now focus on the domain of the symmetric key based re-encryption schemes, where we distinguish the schemes [18] [19] [20] . The approach in [18] is efficient, but insecure, as each user is able to derive the secret key of the other user and thus impersonate that user. Moreover, in [18] and [19] , an unrealistic assumption is made that both sender and receiver possess in advance a common shared key. In [20] , the scheme AKAPR, Authentication Key Agreement mediated by a Prxoy Re-Encryptor for IoT, has been presented. This scheme is the first symmetric key based proxy re-encryption scheme in literature, capable to establish a common shared key between two IoT devices which do not have a common prior trust relation. However, this scheme and also [18] , [19] require an interactive Key Distribution Center (KDC) to derive the re-encryption key for the proxy. Due to this requirement, the KDC needs to be permanently online, increasing its vulnerability for denial of service and other related security attacks. Moreover, none of the schemes [18] [19] [20] are able to offer identity protection for the entities. An outsider, able to eavesdrop on the communication channel, is able to follow the communication flow between the different entities and potentially derive interesting patterns out of this information. Especially for the last two issues, we will give an adequate solution. Finally, there is also a recent paper [21] , which is mainly limited to the authentication between user and IoT device through a completely trusted proxy. This proxy takes the role of KDC. Only symmetric key mechanisms are used in the protocol.
The technique to establish the anonymity comes from the area of smart card based server authentication protocols. There are again symmetric key based and public key based approaches in this domain. When limiting the discussion to the symmetric key based schemes and the more general multi-server authentication protocols, we can distinguish the following most relevant and secure schemes, [22] [23] [24] . In [23] , the server requires an additional communication with the KDC during each authentication. This communication is not required in [22] and [24] . The schemes of [22] and [24] are quite similar, except that [24] also includes unlinkability. The proposed re-encryption schemes in this paper are based on the techniques from [24] , but have some significant changes as the setting is not a server-based, but a peer-to-peer architecture.
3 Network Architecture and Preliminaries
Setting and assumptions
We assume there are three entities participating in the system: the Key Distribution Center (KDC), the proxy P k , and the nodes or entities (U 1 , . . . , U m ). Node U i wants to securely communicate with node U j (1 ≤ i, j ≤ m), using an arbitrary proxy P k . We assume that U i and U j are highly resource constrained. Note that U j can also be an external more powerful entity, requesting information on one of the entities in the network. The KDC is responsible for generating and sharing the secret key material with the different nodes and the proxies. In the case of the interactive KDC, the proxy communicates with the KDC to receive the re-encryption key. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the network system model for the 2 versions of the ALPKA scheme in both the healthcare domain and industrial internet respectively.
We further assume that the KDC is fully trusted and the proxy semitrusted. This means that the proxy will execute all the required actions as prescribed in the protocol, but is also curious to derive the content of the ciphertexts and the common shared session key.
Cryptographic requirements
Proxy re-encryption schemes are characterized according to different criteria [16, 25] . We also add the anonymity and unlinkability feature to the list, as they are more and more considered as important requirements in current IoT systems [3] . These criteria are enumerated below: -Directionality: There are two options. If the re-encryption key of the proxy can only be used in one direction by the proxy, it is called unidirectional. In contrast, a bidirectional scheme allows the proxy to reuse the re-encryption key for messages between the same two entities, independent of their role of sender or receiver. -Interactivity: In a non-interactive scheme, the sender can generate a reencryption key independent of the participation of the KDC or the proxy.
In an interactive scheme, the active participation of both proxy and KDC is required. -Usability: If the proxy re-encryption scheme can re-encrypt a ciphertext multiple times for different entities, it is called multiple-use. If the proxy is able to perform only one re-encryption, it is called a single use scheme.
-Transitivity: In a transitive proxy re-encryption scheme, the proxy can derive the proxy re-encryption key for communication from node U i to U l , given the proxy re-encryption keys for communications from nodes U i to U j and U j to U i . If not, the scheme is called non-transitive. -Collusion resistant: If a node collaborates with the proxy, it is able to decrypt all the messages sent in the system. -Anonymity: From the transmitted messages, no information on the identity of the sender and the intended receiver can be derived by an outsider. -Unlinkabiity: When collecting the transmitted messages over a long time, no relation can be made between them to link the messages with the same sender or receiver.
Operations
The operations used in the scheme are limited to simple and symmetric key based operations. The operation H : {0, 1} * ⇒ {0, 1} n is a one-way cryptographic hash function (eg. SHA2 or SHA3). An authenticate encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the message (e.g. AES-GCM or AES-CCM).
The concatenation of two messages M 1 and M 2 is denoted by M 1 M 2 . We denote by M the message sent by the sender. The ciphertext C, obtained by the encryption of M through a symmetric key encryption algorithm using key K, is defined as C = E K (M ). Similar, the decryption by the symmetric key K is denoted by M = D K (C). We assume that these functions are implemented in each entity and proxy which are participating in the scheme. Table 1 summarises the most important notations to be used in the rest of the paper. A symmetric key based proxy re-encryption scheme consists of five phases, being the Key Generation (KeyGen), the Re-encryption Key Generation (ReKey-Gen), the Encryption (Encrypt), the Re-Encryption (ReEncrypt), and Decryption (Decrypt) phase. The KDC will be responsible for the KeyGen and ReKeyGen phases, the sender for the Encrypt phase, the proxy for the ReEncrypt phase, and the receiver for the Decrypt phase. We suppose that U i will delegate the decryption right of the ciphertext C to U j with the help of the proxy P k , resulting in the derivation of the common shared session key. We now describe these different phases of our proposed key agreement protocols into detail. Note that we explain both schemes together as they are very similar and differ only at a few places. In the first version of the scheme, also called ALPKA 1, the proxy needs an interactive KDC to receive a re-encryption key. In the second case, ALPKA 2, the proxy does not need a separate re-encryption key and thus, corresponds with a non interactive scheme.
Key Generation (KeyGen)
We suppose the KDC possesses three master secret values x, y, z. The KDC shares a different type of information to the entities U i and to the proxies P k . We discuss both, the initialisation of the key material and the required updates.
-Initialization: For each entity U i with serial number ID i , the KDC computes the following information
The KDC securely sends the information B i , H(A i ), s i , H(x) to the entity U i . From now on, the identity of the entities is replaced by the publicly known value B i . The other values H(A i ), s i , H(x) are kept secret. For the proxies P k with identity ID k , the KDC sends the information H(z y) and H(ID k H(x)). The identity of the proxy ID k is public, while the values H(z y) and H(ID k H(x)) are kept secret. Note that a secure channel between the KDC and each of the entities, the KDC and each of the proxies is required during this phase. For the entities, this can be established by pre-installation, while for the proxies standardized security protocols can be applied as they are not considered as constrained devices. -Update: As the value H(x) is shared among all devices in the network, a regular update on the secret parameter x is required. Therefore, a unicast message containing the new secret value will be send from the KDC to the entity U i , using the shared secret key s i . Simultaneously, updates on H(ID k H(x)) will be send to the different proxies. Also regular updates on H(z y) are required, as this value is shared among the different proxies. In order to avoid an impact on a change of the value A i of the entities, and thus indirectly on the values H(A i ), s i that are stored in the nodes, it is sufficient to only update the parameter y. Consequently, an update on y, influences H(z y) of the proxies and also only the value B i on the side of the entities.
Re-encryption Key Generation (ReKeyGen)
Note that the re-encryption key is only required for the ALPKA 1 scheme. In ALPKA 2, this key does not exist. The re-encryption key for the communication between entities U i and U j , denoted by rk ij , is determined by
Consequently, it holds that rk ij = rk ji . This leads to a bidirectional scheme, as also discussed further in the next section.
Encryption (Encrypt)
First, the entity U i , chooses a random value t ∈ Z p and then computes, using its secret value s i and the public identity B j of U j , the random value:
Next, the following computations are performed:
For the key K i in the last encryption, there are two possibilities i = 1 and i = 2, leading to the definitions of
The key K 1 is used in the ALPKA 1, while the key K 2 in the ALPKA 2. Finally, as last step in the Encrypt phase, the message {C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , CID i , C} is sent to the proxy P k . Here CID i is the part of the message that refers to the dynamic identity of B i . The dynamic character is obtained based on the value C 1 . The parameter C 2 hides the random value N i that is used in the key definition, and C 3 hides the identity of the receiver B j .
Re-Encryption (ReEncrypt)
This phase can be split into two parts. The first part is required to check the message of the sender, while in the second part the preparation of the message to be forwarded to the receiver is made. Below, we discuss into detail the actions to be performed by the proxy in this phase.
Upon arrival of the message {C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , CID i , C}, the proxy executes the following steps:
In the ALPKA 2 scheme, the proxy needs to communicate N i to the entity U j , while in the ALPKA 1 scheme, this value should be updated by means of the re-encryption key rk ij (generated in the ReKeyGen phase). Figure 3 gives a schematic overview of the different steps to be performed in the Encrypt, the ReKeyGen, and the first part of the ReEncrypt phase by the sender U i and proxy P k . The result of the KeyGen phase is also depicted. Note that the public part of the key material, present at each entity and proxy, is on the first line and the secret part on the second line in the figure. Finally, the only difference up to now between ALPKA 1 and ALPKA 2 is in the definition of N i , where for ALPKA 1 the ReKeyGen phase is required to use the resulting re-encryption key for updating N i .
In the second part of the ReEncrypt phase, the following computations are executed by the proxy:
Finally, the message containing {C 4 , C 5 , C} is sent to U j . Here, the parameter C 4 is meant to hide the random value N i to be used in the key definition, while C 5 hides the identity of the sender B i .
Decryption (Decrypt)
Upon arrival of this message, U j performs the following computations: Only for the ALPKA 1 scheme, U j needs to derive in addition the value t, which equals due to the definition of the re-encryption key, to
Consequently, for the decryption of the ciphertext C, the shared secret key should be derived, which equals to K 1 in the ALPKA 1 and K 2 in the ALPKA 2.
The exact values are determined by: Figure 4 gives a schematic overview of the different steps to be performed by the proxy P k and receiver U j , in the second part of the ReEncrypt phase and the DeCrypt phase.
Protocol Analysis
This section discusses the strength of the ALPKA 1 and ALPKA 2 protocols against the required security features of a proxy re-encryption scheme, as mentioned in Section 3.
-Directionality: In the case of the ALPKA 1 scheme, where the proxy needs to receive a re-encryption key of the KDC, the scheme is bidirectional. Both for the communication from U i to U j and vice versa, the re-encryption scheme is similar, due to construction, i.e.
In the ALPKA 2 scheme, this feature is not applicable since there is no re-encryption key used. -Interactivity: The presence of this feature is one of the main differences between ALPKA 1 and ALPKA 2 schemes. The protocol ALPKA 1 is not interactive as for the computation of the key K 1 by the receiver, since the proxy first needs to use additional information (proxy re-encryption key) coming from the KDC. For the key K 2 in ALPKA 2 on the other hand, it suffices to securely forward the random value N i , generated by the sending entity. Unfortunately, we explain later that it is not possible to combine the non-interactive property with a collusion resistant feature. -Usability: The ALPKA 1 scheme cannot be made multiple use, as the proxy requires the knowledge of the combined secret information from solely the sender and the receiver for the re-encryption key. The ALPKA 2 scheme could allow multiple use if the construction of the key slightly changes. For instance, if K 2 = H(B i H(x) H(N i )), i.e., if the information of the receiver is removed from the definition of the key. However, in this case, the sender does not have any control on who will receive the message, and thus this feature might not be very interesting. -Transitivity: As this feature involves a property on the proxy re-encryption key, it is only relevant for ALPKA 1. Transitivity is obtained as the reencryption key combines the secret information of both sender and receiver by multiplication. Since the single secret information of one of the two is not known and cannot be extracted by combining multiple re-encryption keys from different pairs of senders and receivers, it is impossible to construct a new re-encryption key from this information. -Collusion resistant: First of all, a compromised proxy cannot generate new authorized entities, as the construction of the values A i require the knowledge of the master key y of the KDC. Also a compromised node on itself is not able to decrypt messages (not intended to him). It is only able to derive the identity of the sender and the receiver from the transmitted messages. For the impact on the security when both a compromised proxy and entity collaborate, the two ALPKA schemes are discussed separately.
-For the computation of K 1 in ALPKA 1, the secret information of either sender or receiver is required. Suppose a malicious user collaborates with the proxy, it is only able to derive the messages sent by himself or sent to a particular receiver as the re-encryption key involves the secret information of both the sender and the receiver. For the transmission of information between other entities, their combined knowledge allows only to the malicious user to derive the identity of the sender and receiver as explained later, but cannot be exploited to decrypt their messages. -For the derivation of K 2 in ALPKA 2, no individual secret information of the sender s i or receiver s j is used. Its secrecy mainly depends on two types of values, which are asymmetrically divided among the entities and the proxy. First, there is the value H(x), which is shared among all authorized users and not the proxy. Second, there are also the individual secret data H(A i ), H(A j ), which are only shared between the proxy and the sender and receiver respectively since the proxy possesses the key H(z y) to transform the public identity information B i , B j into the values A i , A j . Consequently, not the proxy or another authorized entity besides B i , B j is able to decrypt the transmitted ciphertext C as the combined knowledge of these two types of values is required. However, when a malicious user collaborates with the proxy, this asymmetric division of the key material no longer holds and the proxy gets also aware of the value H(x), making it possible to derive the secret key K 2 . Also the malicious user gets to know H(z y), allowing them to derive the values of H(A i ), H(A j ), and thus to compute the secret key K 2 . -Anonymity: The identity of the entity ID i corresponds with the publicly shared pseudo identity B i . Let us analyze the information, which is derived from the message sent by U i and the message sent by the proxy.
The information related to the identity of the sender B i is hidden in the values C 1 , CID i . Here, C 1 is required in order to make the identity related information of the sender dynamic by including the random value N i . The value C 3 hides the information on the identity of the receiver, through the usage of the secret shared value H(A i ) with the proxy. It is made dynamic by including a part of the message C 1 into the hash value. Finally, as the receiver will be able to derive N i in the end, it is important that the value H(A i ) cannot be directly derived by the receiver from this message. Therefore, H(A i ) is incorporated in a hash containing another dynamic value, like in C 2 . -Message {C 4 , C 5 , C}. Only the identity related information B i of the sender is hidden in the message part C 5 , since the receiver already knows that the information is coming from the proxy. Again, this value C 5 is made dynamic by the inclusion of a random value. -Unlinkability: As explained before, due to the usage of secret key material and the inclusion of a random value in the message parts CID i , C 1 , C 3 , C 5 , allowing the derivation of the identity related information of sender B i and receiver B j , the messages are unlinkable. Table 2 compares the above described list of security features with the other symmetric key based proxy re-encryption schemes [18] [19] [20] in literature. As can be concluded from Table 2 , our ALPKA 1 and ALPKA 2 schemes add the anonymity and unlinkability features to the existing state of the art schemes. In addition, ALPKA 2 is the first non-interactive symmetric key based proxy re-encryption scheme. However, this feature is not compatible with collusion resistance. Consequently, there is also the ALPKA 1 scheme, which adds the anonymity and unlinkability features, while still resisting collusions, but requiring continuous interaction between the proxy and the KDC. Note that instead of requiring the continuous interaction of the KDC, making it vulnerable to a whole range of security attacks, the proxy can also store all possible re-encryption keys for each pair of entities in the system, as proposed in [20] .
Since in ALPKA 2 no re-encryption key is used, the features of directionality and non-transitivity are not applicable.
Finally, we also want to note that the communication overhead in the ALPKA protocols is limited to one additional message part C 1 , enabling the unlinkability of the messages. All other message parts correspond with required information: the identity of sender, receiver, additional information for the key derivation, and ciphertext.
Formal Verification of the ALPKA Protocol
In this section we formally verify the correctness of our proposed protocol by formally analysing the security goals of the protocol (i.e., authentication, session-key establishment) We are using an automated modal logic-based of knowledge CDVT/AD [4] , [5] , [28] , [29] , [30] , [31] .
The CDVT/AD verification tool is an automated system that implements a modal logic of knowledge [29] and an attack detection theory for identification of freshness and man-in-the-middle attacks [30] . The tool uses a proving engine based on the Layered Proving Trees concept [31] and can analyze the evolution of knowledge and belief during a protocol execution. Therefore, it is useful in addressing issues of both security and trust.
Prior to the automated verification using the CDVT logic of knowledge, the scheme must be formalized, i.e. translated into the language of the tool [5] . A formalized protocol consists of three components:
1. Initial assumptions (conditions that hold before the protocol starts); 2. Protocol steps (the messages exchanged between the principals); 3. Protocol goals (conditions that are expected to hold if the protocol terminates successfully).
The following notations are used when translating the scheme into the language of the CDVT/AD tool: Key Distribution Center: KDC Trusted Third Party: TTP User Ui: Principal Ui; User Uj: Principal Uj; Proxy Pk: Sk; Secrets possessed by KDC x, y, z: Nx, Ny, Nz The CDVT/AD tool applies the axioms and rules of the implemented logic of knowledge in an attempt to derive the protocol goals as a logical consequence of the initial assumptions and the protocol steps. If such a derivation exists, the verification is successful and the verified protocol can be considered secure within the scope of the logic. Express Ui possessions at time t0
Step 2: C4, C5, C Ny) ))), XOR(H(Nz,Ny), H(Ui,Ny))); S2: Uj receive at [2] {m}H(Nt);
Security Goals
The objective of the proposed scheme is the establishment of the session keys and the authentication of the users. The formalized goals of the scheme are as follows:
Verify if the establishment of the session keys is done correctly (i.e. secrecy of the key components and their possessions by the legitimate users)
Verification Results
The results of the automated verification for the above formalized scheme are shown in Figure 4 . Goals G1-G11 relate to the establishment of the session keys and check for the secrecy of the key components and their possessions by the legitimate corresponding users, while goals G12-G14 relate to the authentication of the users. As presented in Figure 5 , all security goals are successfully verified. This provides confidence in the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed protocol.
Performance analysis
In this section we discuss the computational complexity of our scheme and compare it with [20] . As mentioned before, [20] is the only other symmetric key based proxy re-encryption scheme in literature which does not assume that the sender and receiver possess in advance a prior secret key. From the sender side, both ALPKA 1 and ALPKA 2 require 8 hash operations and 1 encryption. From the receiver side, 1 encryption and 5 hashes are required in ALPKA 1, while 1 encryption and 4 hashes in ALPKA 2. Taking into account that Key Derivation Functions (KDF) and Message Authentication Codes (MAC) have similar complexity as a hash operation, therefore [20] , requires 2 encryptions and 5 hashes at sender side and 2 encryptions and 4 hashes at receiver side.
In order to get a better understanding of the impact of these numbers, we consider measurements performed on a smartphone with Android OS (Android 4.4 KitKat) consisting of a 2260 MHz ARM device. The timings for both AES128 as encryption algorithm and SHA2 as hash operation, correspond with 0.1 ms [32] . Consequently, both schemes have comparable and negligible computational complexity.
Conclusions
This paper proposes two versions of anonymous lightweight proxy based key agreement protocols, called ALPKA 1 and ALPKA 2. They are lightweight as only symmetric key based operations are involved in our proposed protocols and have limited communication overhead. Both protocols allow highly constrained entities, that have never met before in order to share a secret key in an anonymous and unlinkable way through a proxy. This proxy is responsible for the authentication of the entities and the further derivation of the required key material allowing the decryption by the receiver, while not being capable of decrypting the message itself. The main difference between the two versions is the combination of interactivity and collusion resistance versus noninteractivity and not being resistant to collisions. As continuous interactivity between the proxy and the KDC cannot always be ensured, it is important to give an alternative with some small cost in security. Moreover, the security properties of the proposed protocol are verified by using formal verification techniques. This provides confidence in the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed protocol.
As future work, we plan to investigate how the proposed protocols can be applied in the context of internet-connected cars. As our scheme is highly efficient, it offers low latency and is very scalable, we believe that it might offer a good solution to this domain, considering the high number of vehicles required to communicate in real-time.
